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Notes
Intellectual Property Collaboration
Stresses in Bankruptcy: Protecting the
Rights of the Nonbankrupt Parties
by
JEFFREY M. LEVINSOHN*

The Hypothetical Situation
After enjoying an incredibly successful time in the medical
device industry throughout the previous decade, Debtor Corporation
is now a financially distressed biotechnology company. Debtor owns
several intangible rights to a very valuable medical device, the
CureAll, that enjoys a dominant market position, though sales and
profits have been steadily declining over the past two years. Because
of CureAll's history of treatment success and name recognition
among practitioners and consumers, in addition to the patent rights,
the trademark for this device is also very valuable.
The CureAll technology is based on a bundle of intellectual
property rights owned or licensed by Debtor. The intellectual
property and related agreements include: (1) patents owned by
Debtor, (2) patents licensed and sublicensed from Debtor's key
business partners, (3) the trademark, and (4) related contracts with its
key business partners requiring technical collaboration, joint
development and territorial allocated marketing. Specifically, Debtor
has ongoing relationships with three key entities: Distributor,
Licensee, and Collaborator.
Debtor has set up a meeting with these three companies to
discuss Debtor's dire financial state and potential solutions in light of
the group's technical collaboration. Debtor demands that its partners
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2003; B.S.
Northwestern University, 2000. I especially thank Larry Engel for his valuable time,
comments, and insight, without which this writing would not have been possible.
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make substantial equity investments to cover Debtor's losses deriving
from the CureAll and other unrelated, failed business ventures. If the
partner entities refuse to make those investments, Debtor threatens
to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy and cram down a plan of reorganization
with funding from a new strategic investor. By exploiting the
vulnerability in its collaboration and other agreements, Debtor has
the power to ensure, at the very least, that its business partners do not
retain the full benefit of the prebankruptcy bargain.' It is more likely,
though, that Debtor will be able to substantially disable the business
operations of Distributor, Licensee, and Collaborator from operating
as before the bankruptcy in order to force cooperation with Debtor's
current and future business plans.
Introduction
One consequence of the technology explosion in the last decade
was the dominance of a wide variety of commercial technology
collaborations and alliances. These collaborations included creative
cross-licensing of intellectual property, joint research and
development agreements, and other technology partnering and
product distribution agreements. As parties to those alliances are
now discovering in the current recession, the bankruptcy of one party
to those transactions can create serious problems for other parties.
This is especially true where the documentation and structure of
those transactions were not designed to protect the expectations of
the nonbankrupt parties in the bankruptcy, though some of the
problems are inherent in current bankruptcy and intellectual property
law.
Customs and practices of intellectual property attorneys are
often vulnerable to unintended consequences when their standard
forms and transaction structures are later attacked under bankruptcy
and other commercial laws. As a result, trustees in bankruptcy and
bankruptcy lawyers are now learning how to exploit those
vulnerabilities to the growing distress of the intellectual property and
technology community. What is clear is that the bankruptcy culture is
focused on goals that often clash with the practices and expectations
of intellectual property collaborators. This Note addresses some of
the legal and practical issues that arise in these bankruptcy cases, as

1. See Richard M. Cieri & Michelle M. Morgan, Licensing Intellectual Property and
Technology from the Financially-Troubledor Startup Company: Prebankruptcy Strategies
to Minimize the Risk in a Licensee's Intellectual Property and Technology Investment, 55
Bus. LAW. 1649, 1651 (2000); David R. Kuney, Intellectual Property Law in Bankruptcy
Court: The Search for a More Coherent Standard in Dealing with a Debtor's Right to
Assume and Assign Technology Licenses, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 593, 594-95

(2001).
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well as the viability of the defensive strategies that the technology
companies and intellectual property owners are using as they adapt
their forms and practices to prevent adverse past experiences from
occurring once again in future bankruptcy cases.
I.

Background Law

A. Executory Contracts Generally
Once a company files its petition for bankruptcy, "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property" become property of the
bankruptcy estate as required under section 541 of the Bankruptcy
Code.2 The property defined in section 541 includes "intellectual
property," which is defined in section 101 to include U.S. patents and
copyrights, and trade secrets generally, but not U.S. or foreign
trademarks.'
Once within the bankruptcy estate, all executory
contracts are examined by the trustee in bankruptcy and, ultimately,
are either rejected or assumed (and if assumed can often be assigned
to a third party).4 Debtors in possession (when the debtor itself
continues to manage its own property during the bankruptcy) have
rights comparable to the trustee in this regard
Although the
Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes an executory
contract, it has been typically interpreted to include those agreements
where the obligations "of both the bankrupt and the other party to
the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing
the performance of the other."6 Section 365 allows the trustee or
debtor in possession to maximize the return to the creditors by
examining the various executory contracts and choosing to preserve
valuable contracts for itself or a buyer-assignee and to reject
burdensome contracts.' However, the trustee must assume all or
none of the contract and cannot "cherry pick" parts of the contract to
2. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2001); see S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1995).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A). Also included are United States mask works, patent
applications and plant varieties. Id.
4. Id. § 365(a). If the contract is neither assumed nor assigned and the debtor
successfully reorganizes under section 365, the contract "rides through" to the reorganized
company. Id.
5. See id. § 1107 (reference to a "trustee" includes the debtor and vice versa); see, e.g.,
Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996).
6. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV.
439, 460 (1973). However, some courts expand this test with a "result oriented" policy test
that includes some deals that do not meet the classic definition. Interview with Larry
Engel, Partner, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, in San Francisco, Cal. (Winter, 2002).
7. See Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, Inc., 4 F.3d 1095, 1098 (2d Cir.

1993).
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assume or reject.
Licensing agreements are usually considered to be executory
contracts under the relevant case law, because both parties have

continuing material obligations to fulfill.9 The licensee is obligated
under the contract to pay some royalty or other financial
consideration to the licensor (or, even if the royalty is prepaid, not to
prejudice the licensor's intellectual property rights) and to use the
intellectual property in accordance with any restrictions in the
agreement.' ° In return, the licensor agrees not to sue the licensee for
infringement.

There are some important restrictions on assumption and
rejection of executory contracts that are worth noting. First, if the
debtor defaulted on a given executory contract (other than "ipso

facto" defaults), a trustee may not assume that contract, unless the
trustee cures past defaults and provides adequate assurance of
performance of the future obligations under the contract.12 Second, as

mentioned previously, if a trustee assumes an executory contract, it
can not only assume the parts that are to the debtor's benefit, but
must assume the entire contract with all of its benefits and burdens. 3
With respect to rejection, a trustee may only reject an executory

contract subject to the bankruptcy court's approval. 4 However, the
decision by a trustee to assume or reject an executory contract is
entitled to deference from the court under the business judgment

rule.'5 Under this standard, the decision will only be denied in the
case of bad faith or under other special circumstances.' 6 For example,
solvent debtors may not be permitted to reject executory contracts."
The Bankruptcy Code also dictates the time at which the
8. See, e.g., Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303. 1311 (5th
Cir. 1985).
9. See, e.g., Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver, 625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1980); Institut
Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 490 (1st Cir. 1997).
10. See In re Access Beyond Techs., Inc., 237 B.R. 32,43 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
11. See id.
12. 11 U.S.C §§ 365(b), 365 (c), 365 (e) (2001). Defaults do not have to be cured if
there is breach of a provision relating to the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor
before the closing of the case, the commencement of a case under the Bankruptcy Code,
the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in bankruptcy or a custodian before
commencement of the bankruptcy, or the satisfaction of any penalty provision relating to a
default arising from the failure by the debtor to perform nonmonetary obligations under
the executory contract. Id.
13. See In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 860 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1988);
Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1311 (5th Cir. 1985).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
15. See Richmond Leasing, 762 F.2d at 1308-09 (looking at the bad faith of bankruptcy
decisions).
16. See id.
17. See, e.g., In re Chi-Feng Huang, 23 B.R. 798, 803 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982).
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nondebtor's damages are calculated for rejection of an executory
contract by a trustee." If a debtor rejects an unassumed executory
contract, the breach is set immediately before the date that the debtor
filed its bankruptcy petition.' 9 As a result, the court treats any claim
by a nondebtor party that arises from the rejection and breach of such
contract as a general unsecured claim, which are often paid a
disappointing percentage on the dollar.0 If the debtor assumes an
executory contract and subsequently rejects that contract, the breach
is set on the date the contract was rejected.2' In that case, claims for
breach of contract resulting from that later rejection receive priority
treatment as an administrative expense, because the breach occurred
post-petition. Those claims are paid out before general unsecured
claims and thus typically at a much higher percentage on the dollar as
compared to general unsecured claims. 23 Therefore, the nondebtor is
in a stronger position and has more leverage over the debtor when
the debtor assumes and then rejects an executory contract.
B.

The Automatic Stay
There are two main statutory protections that have been used by
trustees and debtors to prevent actions against them for violations of
intellectual property rights: section 362(a)(3) and section 362(a)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Code.2
Section 362(a)(3) protects the bankruptcy estate by preventing
"any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate."
Section 541 defines property of the debtor's estate to include "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case. 2 6 Intangible rights such as patents,
trademarks, and copyrights are included in this definition of property
of the estate in section 541.27 Therefore, "any attempt to restrict or
limit a debtor's use of its intellectual property, even if such use by
debtor [allegedly] infringes on another party's intellectual property,

18. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a); In re Gen. Dev. Corp., 84 F.3d 1364, 1373 (11th Cir. 1996).
19. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g)(1), 502(g).
20. See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v.Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 530 (1984).
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(2)(A).
22. See In re Klein Sleep Prods., Inc., 78 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir. 1996).
23. See id.
24. Richard M. Cieri, Neil Olack & Joseph Witalec, Protecting Technology and
Intellectual Property Rights When a Debtor Infringes on Those Rights, 8 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 349, 372-73 (2000).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
27. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 175-76 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6136.
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could be construed as an attempt to 'exercise control' over property
of the estate," and would be prohibited under section 362(a)(3),
absent relief from the stay granted by the bankruptcy court.28
Section 362(a)(1) prohibits the commencement or continuation
of litigation against a party in bankruptcy that "was or could have
been commenced" before the party filed its bankruptcy petition." If a
cause of action for infringement or otherwise arises post-petition, that
action would not be stayed by section 362(a)(1).' There are two
instances when the applicability of section 362(a)(1) is not in doubt.
If an intellectual property holder sues for damages based on
infringement that occurred entirely pre-petition, it would have been
possible to commence that action pre-petition. Therefore, section
362(a)(1) will stay the action in that case." Likewise, if the alleged
infringement did not begin until after the petition was filed, section
362(a)(1) would not prevent an action, because the nondebtor could
not have commenced the suit pre-petition. That action would have to
be commenced in the bankruptcy court, even if a party intended to
seek revocation of the reference so the district court could try the
case. 2 Federal claims, such as infringement of federal intellectual
property rights, are a common basis for revoking the reference by the
nondebtor parties, who invariably prefer the district court forum.
It is more problematic to determine the outcome in a situation
where the debtor commits infringement activity both pre-petition and
post-petition. This is an important determination, because a few
courts have interpreted the automatic stay to stay actions for postpetition acts where those acts are deemed entirely separate from prepetition acts.34 On the other hand, other courts correctly see post-

petition conduct as a continuation of pre-petition conduct and will not
preclude an action covering post-petition conduct under section
362(a)(1).35

28. Cieri, Olack & Witalec, supra note 24, at 378.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Sultana Crackers, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 899, 917
(E.D.N.Y.1988).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (2001); Larami Ltd. v. Yes! Entm't Corp., 244 B.R. 56, 60
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2000).
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (holding that a district court may withdraw any case or
proceeding referred to the bankruptcy court on its own motion or the motion of a party
where resolution requires consideration of both the Bankruptcy Code and other laws of
the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce).
34. See Voice Sys. & Services, Inc., v. VMX, Inc., No. 91-C-88-B, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21744 at **28-29 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 5, 1992).
35. See In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 140 B.R.
969, 976 (Bankr. N.D. Il.1992).
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II. The Debtor as a Party to an Intellectual Property License
The broad purpose of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code is to
protect the debtor's estate by permitting the trustee to retain valuable
contracts and abandon burdensome ones in order to maximize the
value of the debtor's estate.36 Sections 365(c) and 365(n), however,
temper the traditional protections given to the estate and show partial
deference to the rights of licensees or licensors under the intellectual
property laws. 37 These two sections impose limitations on the power

of a trustee to assume, assign, or reject executory contracts and
provide additional protection to nonbankrupt parties to certain
intellectual property agreements."
A. The Debtor as a Licensee

The trustee's power to assume or assign an executory contract is
expressly limited by section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and
(1) applicable law excuses the
prohibits assumption where:
nondebtor from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to an entity other than the debtor, and (2) the
nondebtor does not consent to such assumption.39 Courts have taken
one of two general approaches to determine whether to allow a
debtor to assume an executory contract involving intellectual
property: the actual test and the hypothetical test.40 The test that a
court in a given circuit chooses to apply under section 365(c) will
often be determinative as to whether, among other things, a third
party in competition with the nondebtor-licensor will be able to
obtain the rights to the nondebtor's intellectual property, for
example, in a sale free and
41 clear of liens, claims and encumbrances
pursuant to section 363(f).

The courts are also split over whether different bankruptcy
results are dictated by the characterization of the applicable license as
'"exclusive" or "nonexclusive," purporting to derive the answer by

36. See 1 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL $ 365.01 (Lawrence R. King ed., 3d ed.
2001).
37. Madlyn G. Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-Commerce and Dot-Com
Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment, and Rejection of Executory Contracts, Including
Intellectual Property Agreements, and Related Issues under Sections 365(c), 365(e) and
365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 307, 314 (2000).
38. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2001); David M. Jenkins, Licenses, Trademarks, and
Bankruptcy, Oh My!: Trademark Licensing and the Perils of Licensor Bankruptcy, 25
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 143, 146-48 (1991).
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1).

40. Aleta A. Mills, Note, The Impact of Bankruptcy on Patent and Copyright Licenses,
17 BANKR. DEV. J. 575,589 (2001).

41. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
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reference to the applicable intellectual property laws.42 In copyright
law, the grant of an exclusive license is a transfer of copyright
ownership and thus, arguably, does not invoke the protections of
section 365(c) (copyrights subject to an exclusive license are freely
assignable under applicable law). 3 In patent and trademark law, on
the other hand, an exclusive license is not necessarily an absolute
transfer of ownership, and applicable law may excuse the licensor
from accepting performance from or rendering performance to a
party other than the debtor-licensee." Exclusive rights sometimes
cause the bankruptcy courts to label the entire license as "exclusive"
as opposed to nonexclusive.45 In reality the complex contracts in the
world of patents and other intellectual property can have both
exclusive rights and nonexclusive rights contained therein, in which
case the license
is arguably still nonexclusive for these bankruptcy
46
purposes. Trying to force those complex contracts into an "exclusive
license" label for the purposes of section 365(c) does not implement
or recognize intellectual property laws, but rather covertly advances
the bankruptcy court's preference for assumable and assignable
contracts (thus maximizing the return to creditors at the expense of
nondebtor parties).4 ' Those different bankruptcy results sometimes
come about from oversimplified translations of the intellectual
property laws to determine whether the intellectual property
contracts can be assumed and, if desired, assigned under section 365."
Part of our analytical challenge is that, when confronted by
difficult problems arising from multi-disciplinary licenses involving
different types of intellectual property, the bankruptcy courts
sometimes oversimplify the problem by ruling on the easier copyright
question and ignoring the more difficult patent and trademark
questions.49 However, the courts ultimately cannot ignore the fact
42. See, e.g., In re Golden Books Family Entm't, Inc., 269 B.R. 311, 318 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2001) (focusing on "exclusive copyright licenses" under the unique provisions of the
Copyright Act which intellectual property lawyers know cannot be properly extrapolated
to other types of intellectual property).
43. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001); Kuney, supranote 1, at 599.
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c). The part of the United States Code dealing with patents
does not have the same analog as the Copyright Act, which deems the exclusive license of
a copyright as a transfer of ownership in that copyright. See 17 U.S.C. 201(d)(2).
45. See, e.g., Golden Books, 269 B.R. at 318.
46. See, e.g., id. at 315, 318.
47. See, e.g., id.
48. See, e.g., id.
49. See, e.g., id. (finding that an exclusive copyright license is assignable under section
365, but ignoring the arguably non-assignable trademark license in the same agreement);
In re Avalon Software, 209 B.R. 517, 522-23 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997) (avoiding a copyright
security interest as unperfected and somehow erasing the perfected patents, trademarks,
and trade secrets also involved). The Avalon holding is negated by implication in In re
World Aux. Power Co., No. 00-16550, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18642 (9th Cir. Sept. 11,
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that each type of intellectual property must be respected, and that
exclusive patent and trademark licenses arguably cannot be assigned
as easily as exclusive copyright licenses, for which there is a unique
statutory arrangement far different from the patent and trademark
laws. °
The First Circuit adopted the "actual" test to determine whether
a debtor can assume a non-exclusive patent license over the objection
of the nondebtor-licensor." Under this test a debtor may assume a
contract that is otherwise non-assignable, because that contract is
personal and non-delegable, unless the nondebtor-licensor can show
that it would not be getting the benefit of its original bargain with the
debtor. 2 In other words, the actual test bars assumption only where
the licensor is actually forced to accept performance from a third
party. 3 In Cambridge Biotech, the court allowed the assumption of
the intellectual property license applying the foregoing analysis.
Through its plan of reorganization, the debtor sold all of its stock, and
thus control over the intellectual property, to the principal competitor
of the nondebtor-licensor 5 Because general corporate law requires
recognition at law of separate corporate entities and the entity
owning the intellectual property rights did not change, the plan was
upheld, at least in the absence of a well-drafted "change in control"
provision. 6 As a result, the First Circuit left the so called "back door"
open for competitors to acquire otherwise inaccessible technology
from a party in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 7
The Third and Ninth Circuits have adopted the "hypothetical"
test, guided by a plain language interpretation of the statute, to
determine whether a debtor can assume a non-exclusive patent
license over the objection of the nondebtor-licensor 8 The debtor
may not assume such an executory contract under this test if
"applicable law would bar assignment to a hypothetical third party,
even where the debtor in possession has no intention of assigning the
contract in question to any such third party."59 Thus, even where the
2002).
50. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 201(d) (2001).
51. See Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493-94 (1st Cir.
1997).
52. Id. at 493.
53. Mills, supra note 40, at 589.
54. CambridgeBiotech, 104 F.3d at 495.
55. Id. at 490-91.
56. Id. at 494.
57. Virginia Henschel, On the Edge: "Back Door" Access to Patented Technology, 17
AM. BANKR. L.J. 40, 41 (1998).
58. Perlman v. Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 75455 (9th Cir. 1999); In re W. Elec., Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 1988).
59. Catapult,165 F.3d. at 750.
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debtor has no intention of assigning the contract to any third party,
the hypothetical test still bars assumption by the debtor if the
nondebtor-licensor objects.6" Thus, the Third and Ninth Circuits
effectively shut the "back door" for obtaining intellectual property
rights from a debtor.6"
The hypothetical test presents the nondebtor-licensor with
extraordinary leverage over the debtor as it effectively gives the
nondebtor veto power over any use of its intellectual property rights
by the debtor, even where the debtor does not intend to assign those
rights (either directly by contract or indirectly by the sale of the
debtor corporation).6 It is easy to see how the nondebtor's power to
block the assumption of a patent right integral to the debtor's
business may prevent the debtor corporation from emerging from
Chapter 11 and continuing as a going concern. In order to address
this risk, many debtors attempt to rush a sale to a buyer under section
363(f) that includes the assignment of nonassignable licenses, hoping
that licensors will not react in time so that the sale order bars the
licensor from later challenging the buyer's rights as successor licensee.
Bankruptcy is a "scream or die" process by which the bankruptcy
court's final order can bind licensors to accept results that would have
been legally impossible if the licensor objected in time before the
order was entered (assuming certain minimal notice requirements are
met). In many other contracts and contexts, though, the debtor has
substantial leverage over the nondebtor, as will be discussed below.
Some bankruptcy courts hostile to the idea of nonassumable and
nonassignable contracts have attempted to use the unique provisions
regarding exclusive copyright licenses (as opposed to patent or
trademark licenses) to defeat the rights of nondebtor-licensors as to
all kinds of intellectual property.63 The Golden Books approach
involves labeling a license as exclusive based on some exclusive rights
within the more complex contract, and ruling that the section 365(c2
protections for licensors are not applicable to exclusive licenses.
The approach assumes away the problems raised by the nonexclusive
rights inherent in most real world contracts or by the interaction of
other types of intellectual property.65 Ultimately, the appellate courts
(especially the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals which often seems to
protect patents from judges with less expertise) probably will resolve
60. Id.
61. Id. at 754-55; In re W. Elec., 852 F.2d at 82.
62. Gregory G. Hesse, On the Edge: Ninth Circuit Slams Shut the "Back Door" Access
to Patented Technology, 1999 ABI JNL. LEXIS 41, at *18 (April, 1999).
63. See, e.g., In re Golden Books Family Entm't, Inc., 269 B.R. 311, 318 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2001).
64. See id.
65. See id.
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this conflict in favor of licensors. In the meantime, licensors can
prevent Golden Books type prejudice in how they structure and
document their agreements. For example, licensors should separate
the copyright license from other intellectual property either with an
independent contract or with stronger provisions which do not allow
the bankruptcy court credibly to ignore everything but what they
label to be an exclusive copyright license.
B.

Our Hypothetical Debtor's Situation
One of Debtor's key partners, Collaborator, is an owner of
intellectual property complementary to the CureAll, including
patents that underlie certain aspects of that device. Collaborator and
Debtor originally agreed to work together and pool their resources
for the creation of separate products based on joint inventions
through complex cross-licensing agreements. Debtor is a licensee in
this relationship in two regards: (1) Debtor has licensed technology
from Collaborator in these agreements, and (2) Debtor has licensed
technology from third parties that it then sublicenses to Collaborator.
Debtor threatens to exploit its relationship with Collaborator and
other parties in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding unless those
parties make financial investments in Debtor's failed business
ventures or pay other "ransom."
In a jurisdiction that applies the actual test (at least where there
is no effective change in control provision in the license, as would be
required under the Cambridge Biotech test), Debtor threatens to
assume its license with Collaborator, use a plan of reorganization to
cancel all of the Debtor's equity and then issue shares of Debtor stock
to Collaborator's key competitor.'
As a result of this plan of
reorganization, if Collaborator is not careful and proactive in its
defenses, Collaborator may be unable to prevent its competitor from
gaining access to its key intellectual property and could lose any
market advantage it once enjoyed over that competitor.67 Smart
collaborators will buy undisputed claims for bulletproof standing and
will actively pursue defensive and offensive strategies broader than
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2001).
67. See Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 494-95 (1st Cir.
1997). On its face, the actual test may seem fair because it allows Debtor to maximize the
underlying value it may have in its licensing contracts to satisfy its obligations to creditors.
Id. In fact, Debtor may owe substantial consideration to Collaborator that could be paid
after assumption of the contract and sale of company stock, although pro rata sharing with
creditors generally dilutes any such recovery. Id. Also, the plan may allow Debtor to
regain viability and fulfill its future obligations under the licensing or other agreements
with Collaborator. Id. Though the creditors as a whole might benefit from this plan of
reorganization, Collaborator obviously bears most of the burden when its key competitor
gains an advantage that may well harm its business. Id.
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their direct contract dispute, because in the endgame it is
comprehensive leverage that counts. Alliances are often critical in
that process, especially where Collaborator has a friend in a position
to enforce infringement claims or to challenge the validity of the
Debtor's intellectual property.
Of course, there are various complex disputes to be resolved
before assumption is approved regarding the cure of defaults and
adequate assurances of future performance under section 365.68 If the
bankruptcy judge confirms the plan, however, meritorious objections
may be lost because the nondebtor's appeals will often be dismissed
on the ground of "mootness" without reaching the merits of the
dispute.6 While mootness is a complex subject beyond the scope of
this Note, obvious errors in the bankruptcy courts are often not
reviewed on their merits and corrected by appellate courts.
In a jurisdiction where the courts are predisposed to follow
Golden Books and impose exclusive copyright license rules on more
complex contracts involving other intellectual property, the contract
can be assumed and assigned by Debtor if vulnerable to that
"exclusive license" label]'
Licensors in Collaborator's position are beginning to negotiate
stronger defenses into their contracts, so as to prevent assumption
and assignment by debtor-licensees without licensor's consent. For
example, licensors' forms now regularly include change in control
protections that might have made a difference in Cambridge Biotech
and other similar cases."
Similarly, a licensor may focus more
specifically on how to structure and integrate or separate the related
contracts, so that the key contracts that benefit it are fully integrated
and require comprehensive assumption and assignment by the debtor,
rather than allowing the debtor to "cherry pick" contracts the debtor
values and reject the rest (presumably threatening to reject or
actually rejecting those that licensor values most).72
To the extent that Debtor loses reciprocal benefits under any
68. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b).
69. See, e.g., In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1996).
70. See In re Golden Books Family Entm't, Inc., 269 B.R. 311, 318 (Bankr. D. Del.
2001).
71. See Cambridge Biotech, 104 F.3d 489.
72. See, e.g., In re Comdisco, Inc., 270 B.R. 909, 912 (Bankr. N.D. Il.2001). One
critical issue is what happens when the debtor tries to assume some and reject other
executory contracts typically comprising a collaboration or alliance transaction. Interview
with Larry Engel, Partner, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, in San Francisco, Cal. (Winter,
2002). Depending upon the drafting of the contracts and the structure of the transaction,
either the rejection or assumption of the contracts is an all or nothing proposition, or else
the debtor can "cherry pick" the contracts it desires and reject the rest. Id. However,
some courts require more than mere cross-defaults to integrate a package of intellectual
property contracts into an all or nothing arrangement. Id.
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cross-license, etc., Debtor has more incentive to work out a mutually
satisfactory arrangement with its business partners.
Some
collaborators structure their deal as a settlement of a court action
(e.g., a stipulated declaratory relief judgment) so as to be able to
argue that there is no "executory contract" that is vulnerable under
section 365. To deal with the risk of unfriendly assignees or
successors to the debtor party, licensors (like Collaborator) are
starting to insert "poison pills" to make competitors less interested in
acquiring the debtor's interest in the license.73
For example,
Collaborator could insert provisions into the license that cause the
royalty rates paid to Collaborator to be increased to economically
unfeasible levels that are triggered under defensible performance
conditions if Debtor assigns the contract to a third party or
participates in a change in control event.
To avoid conflicts
commonly litigated in the parallel landlord-tenant context,
sophisticated parties design indirect performance conditions to
achieve this protection without directly limiting their "bet" just to
assignment.
For example, Collaborator could note that the
collaboration is for personal services with non-competitor Debtor and
if, over Collaborator's objection, Collaborator is stuck with a
competing or otherwise unsuitable party, then Collaborator is not
receiving the value of its collaboration. If this situation does arise, the
original parties to the contract (Debtor and Collaborator) place a
high price on it, in terms of liquidated damages and other required
benefits, including a thorough description to identify conflicts that the
prospective buyer-competitor would hate.
Moreover, licensors like Collaborator increasingly focus on the
personal services aspects of their contractual relationships and ensure
that they effectively condition their benefits to the debtor on their
receipt of the corresponding burdens. For example, instead of the
historical preference in a cross-license for default provisions requiring
notice and an opportunity for cure that prevents the nonbankrupt
party from exercising remedies without relief from the automatic stay
under section 362,"4 licensors now are beginning to say (in effect): "I
73. Examples vary by technology at issue and the industry context, but the acquirer
can be scared off by certain "one-way" rights of first refusal on other collaborations, by
certain "non-competes," by auditing provisions that would expose the competitor's trade
secrets and plans, etc. Id.
74. Absent order of the bankruptcy court (e.g., in response to the licensee's motion for
relief from the stay to enforce the contract or to require the trustee promptly to elect
whether to assume or reject the contract) or by operation of section 365(d)(1) in a Chapter
7 case, the trustee will typically delay the decision to assume or reject the contract as long
as possible, and the bankruptcy court generally will not push the debtor for an early
decision. See, e.g., In re Burger Boys, 94 F.3d 755, 761 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Whitcomb &
Keller Mortgage Co., 715 F.2d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 1983). What licensees can do is request
interim performance by the trustee/licensor pursuant to section 365(n)(4) and create
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grant you a conditional reciprocal cross-license only so long as I am
still entitled at all times without restriction to enforce against you, and
so long as you are performing as agreed, your reciprocal license to
me." By structuring a cross-license conditionally in this way,
Collaborator arguably could stop providing its intellectual property to
Debtor as soon as Debtor failed to perform its specific obligations to
Collaborator under the agreement without having to seek relief from
the automatic stay, since a condition precedent to further
Thus, Collaborator gains
performance would not be satisfied.
leverage to reach a more favorable result for itself in the bankruptcy
proceeding, including, perhaps, blocking Debtor's assignment of
Collaborator's intellectual property to a third party. In any event, it is
possible to draft the cross-license in such a way that it would be
worthless to any future assignee, because that assignee could not
perform the conditional obligations necessary to require
Collaborator's reciprocal performance.
In a jurisdiction that applies the hypothetical test (in contrast to
the actual test), Debtor would not have the same options to coerce
investments or other "ransom" from Collaborator, at least in the case
of nonexclusive licenses.76 The hypothetical test ensures that
Collaborator's intellectual property will not be used by anyone other
than Debtor, if Collaborator objects to assumption of the licensing
agreement." With respect to other potential creditors, though,
Collaborator has more power than those other parties may deem
desirable. Collaborator effectively has the power to veto any plan of
reorganization dependent upon its intellectual property by merely
objecting to assumption. Presumably, Collaborator would not object
where it would be in its best interest for the plan to go through.
However, where creditors as a whole would benefit from a given plan,
but Collaborator would not, Collaborator would still be able to
prevent that plan from going through (thereby depriving the
unsecured creditors of their desired plan).
Under the hypothetical test, Debtor does have one key leverage
point over Collaborator regarding the intellectual property that it
sublicenses to Collaborator. Because Debtor, as licensee, is unable to
assume a licensing agreement with a third party licensor over that
party's objection, Debtor may no longer have the legal right to certain
intellectual property to be provided by sublicense to Collaborator,
leverage in the balance of the estate issues where the creditors have some leverage. Id.
75. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2001). Generally, section 362 operates as a stay of any acts
against the debtor or the property of the estate. Id. However, section 362 would not
prohibit a third party from failing to perform its conditional obligations to a debtor. Id.
76. See Perlman v. Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747,
750 (9th Cir. 1999); Hesse, supra note 62, at **13-14.
77. See Catapult,165 F.3d at 750; Hesse, supra note 62, at **13-14.
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thereby terminating Debtor's sublicense with Collaborator. Debtor
clearly cannot sublicense intellectual property to which Debtor no
longer has the sublicensor's right. If this intellectual property is key
to Collaborator's business going forward, it may be forced to comply
with Debtor's demands to make financial investments, or otherwise
act to preserve the underlying license.
C. The Debtor as a Licensor

Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code applies to protect
nondebtor-licensees when the debtor is also a licensor of intellectual
property."8 That statute was enacted to strike a balance between the
interests of the nondebtor-licensee and the debtor-licensor, following
parallel protections for real estate tenants in the landlord's
bankruptcy.79 Specifically, section 365(n) protects the interest of the
nondebtor-licensee with regard to the continued use of the
intellectual property, yet permits the debtor-licensor to avoid certain
future obligations that may burden the bankruptcy estate.' This
provision was enacted to alleviate the harsh effects that would result
when a debtor-licensor was permitted to reject an intellectual
property licensing agreement (like any other executory contract) and
terminate the licensee's right to use the underlying intellectual
property.' The licensee was left with only a general, pre-petition,
unsecured damages claim for rejection of little value, even though the
licensee's business might have been effectively destroyed without the
use of key intellectual property.82 After the enactment of section
365(n), the bankrupt party theoretically "cannot terminate and strip
the licensee of rights the licensee has bargained for" and the licensee
"cannot retain the use of those rights without paying for them. 83
However, in practice section 365(n) is an imperfect protection for the
nondebtor-licensee.
For the purposes of section 365(n), the term "intellectual
property" includes U.S. patents, U.S. copyrights, and trade secrets
generally, but not trademarks or foreign intellectual property (except
perhaps for trade secrets).8' Also, this section applies to any
intellectual property license entered into pre-petition, as long as the

78. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
79. See, e.g., Encino Bus. Mgmt., Inc. v. Prize Frize, Inc. (In re Prize Frize, Inc.), 32
F.3d 426, 428 (9th Cir. 1994).
80. See, e.g., id.
81. See Lubrizol Enter., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
82. See id.
83. Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 37, at 338.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2001); S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1995).
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term of that license has begun as of the date of the petition.85 For
example, bankruptcy stops new licenses from springing into existence,
and options for licenses are treated as executory contracts not
protected by section 365(n).
Under section 365(n), the licensee generally has the option of
either terminating or retaining its rights when the trustee rejects an
executory contract through which the debtor licenses intellectual
property to the licensee. 86 The licensee may elect
to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such
rejection.., amounts to a breach that would entitle licensee to
treat such contract as terminated by virtue of its own terms,
applicable nonbankruptcy law, or an agreement made by the
licensee with another entity; or
to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity
provision of such contract, but excluding any other right under
applicable nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such
contract) under such contract and under any agreement
supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property... as
such rights existed immediately before the case commenced, for (i)
the duration of such contract; and (ii) any period for which such
contract may be extended by the licensee as of right under
applicable nonbankruptcy law.
If the nondebtor chooses to treat the license as terminated, the
licensee would then become a general unsecured creditor with a claim
for the rejection damages that it sustained as a result of the breach.88
In this situation, it is important to note that the nondebtor-licensee
can cease to perform its obligations under the license as well.8"
However, this option has two main shortcomings in the context of
most intellectual property licensees.' First, it is difficult for the
nondebtor party to prove satisfying monetary damages that resulted
from the breach with reasonable certainty.
That is because the
nondebtor likely does not receive royalties or other monetary
consideration from the debtor that would simplify a damages
calculation, and must therefore attempt to quantify harm to future
profits and the like (which is speculative).
Second, even if the
nondebtor-licensee can estimate resulting damages with reasonable
certainty, a monetary damage award does not give the licensee the
licensed property that it needs to continue its business as before the
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See COLLIER, supra note 36, 365.14[1][a].
11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1).
Id.
See, e.g., In re El Int'l, 123 B.R. 64, 66-67 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991).
11 U.S.C. § 502(g).
Cieri & Morgan, supra note 1, at 1675.
Id.
Id.
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bankruptcy.93 Thus, often it is not an economically satisfying option
for the nondebtor to elect to treat the rejected license to important
and irreplaceable intellectual property as terminated.
Even if the nondebtor-licensee chooses to retain its rights under
the license, section 365 n)(1)(B) does not protect the nondebtorlicensee in certain cases.' The licensee is not protected as to its right
to future specific performance by the debtor-licensor under the
agreement other than the enforcement of an exclusivity clause and
the bare right to use the intellectual property or any embodiment
thereof.9 In addition, a licensee arguably has no rights in the licensed
intellectual property beyond what existed on the petition date. 96 Most
notably, the nondebtor-licensee is obligated, after making the election
to retain its rights, to continue to pay the debtor (or trustee) all
royalties due under the licensing agreement for the initial term of that
agreement and any lawful extension thereof.' The licensee must also
waive any offsetting claim for breach that it has, or may have in the
future, against the debtor-licensor under the agreement other than a
general unsecured claim against the debtor's estate.9
D. Our Hypothetical Debtor's Situation

One of Debtor's key business partners, Licensee, purchased and
contracted to purchase many CureAll devices and has licensed the
use of Debtor's intellectual property. Further, Licensee depends
upon Debtor to provide product maintenance and support on a
continuous basis under the agreement to keep Licensee's business
operational. Debtor has also agreed to provide Licensee with access
to subsequent, improved models of the CureAll as those models are
conceived and produced by Debtor. Another business partner,
Distributor, has entered into a manufacturing license agreement with
Debtor that enables Distributor to manufacture the CureAll using the
intellectual property owned by Debtor. In light of the threats made
by Debtor to disable their respective businesses, Licensee and
Distributor begin to assess their future risks, assuming that Debtor
will reject all executory contracts involving intellectual property.
Both parties have serious concerns as to what they will be able to do
in the event of such rejection. 99
93. Id.
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B).
95. See id.; S. REP. No. 100-505, at 9 (1988).
96. See Szombathy v. Controlled Shredders, Inc., 1997 WL 189314, at **2-3 (N.D. I11.
Apr. 14,1997).
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(B); Encino Bus. Mgmt., Inc. v. Prize Frize, Inc. (In re
Prize Frize, Inc.), 32 F.3d 426, 428-29 (9th Cir. 1994).
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(C)(i).
99. See generally id. § 365(n)(1)(B).
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First, both Licensee and Distributor consider one available
option to treat their rights as terminated under the contract, because
Debtor's rejection constitutes a breach.' ° Both companies depend on
the use of Debtor's intellectual property, so a general unsecured
claim for monetary damages would be wholly insufficient, absent a
high percentage of recovery on allowed claims generally. 1 Thus,
Licensee and Distributor decide to analyze the consequences of
retaining their rights under any executory contracts relating to
intellectual property.' 2 The nondebtors also plan for other defensive
and offensive leverage, such as competing to buy the debtor's
relevant assets or business, forming an alliance with others to defeat
Debtor's maneuvers (for example by allying with third parties in a
position to dispute Debtor's intellectual property rights at issue under
the rejected licenses), etc.
Distributor is especially concerned whether Debtor's rejection
under section 365(n) means that it can no longer sell its accumulated
inventory of CureAll devices, because trademarks are not included in
the definition of intellectual property in the Bankruptcy Code."3 The
provisions for retaining intellectual property rights under section
365(n) specifically apply to an executory contract under which Debtor
is a licensor of a right to U.S. patents and copyrights, and trade
secrets generally, but not to trademarks." Thus, with respect to a
license for the use of Debtor's trademarks, the protection of section
365(n) arguably does not even apply.' 5 Accordingly, Debtor would
be able to reject any agreement licensing the use of its trademark to
Distributor, and Distributor's only direct recourse would be a general
unsecured damages claim.'" However, Distributor could attempt to
argue that the trademark license agreement was an "agreement
supplementary" to the patent license (which is intellectual property)
and therefore Distributor is entitled to retain its rights to the
trademark, although bankruptcy courts are unfriendly to that
approach. 7 Also, to strengthen its argument, Distributor could draft
100. See id. § 365(n)(1)(A).
101. See Cieri & Morgan, supra note 1, at 1675.
102. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(n)(1)(B), 365(n)(2).
103. See id. §§ 101(35A), 365(n)(1).
104. Id.
105. See id.; In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002)
(holding that once a license has been rejected, the nondebtor party may not continue to
use trademarks).
106. See Lubrizol Enter., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B). But see In re Centura Software, 281 B.R. 660
(disallowing section 365(n) protection for a rejected executory trademark license when it
was possible for the court to interpret that trademark license as supplementary to a
protected copyright license).
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one agreement to effectuate the licensing of all the intellectual
property rights involved, including both trademark and patent rights.
Then, under section 365(n), Distributor could attempt to argue that it
is entitled to retain all its rights under the contract, including those
rights to the CureAll trademark (recognizing, of course, that
bankruptcy courts are unfriendly to that approach). 8
Licensee first turns its attention to the issue of specific
performance and future technological developments specified under
the licensing agreement. As mentioned previously, Licensee is
generally not entitled to future performance by Debtor, even though
that performance may be guaranteed under the executory contract. '°9
Licensee is partially protected by the theoretical right to compel
Debtor to turn over the licensed intellectual property and its
embodiments and enforce the exclusivity provision in the agreement
(thereby preventing Debtor from licensing the intellectual property to
Licensee's competitors). 1'0 However, Licensee is entirely dependent
upon Debtor's technical support to maintain its retail business and to
serve its customers. In addition, copying to allow third party experts
to assist in preserving operability is often outside the license's scope.
Debtor has no obligation to provide such ongoing support (and often
lacks the staff and capability to do so in bankruptcy) even if Licensee
elects to retain its rights under the licensing agreement. Accordingly,
if and to the extent permitted by the license or negotiated with
Debtor, Licensee will be forced to find another outside party, if
possible, to provide the required technical expertise and to incur the
additional expenses necessary to do so. Theoretically, these expenses
could be recovered as damages from the breach, but would be
relegated to a general unsecured claim against Debtor's estate,
typically with a very low likelihood of meaningful recovery."'
On a related issue, Licensee begins to inquire into its own
contractual obligations if Debtor refuses to provide the ongoing
services outlined in the agreement. Specifically, Licensee needs to
know if it will be compelled to make full royalty payments under the
agreement, even if Debtor refuses to provide technical support
relating to the use of the intellectual property. Courts have not yet
108. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1). But see In re Centura Software, 281 B.R. at 660
(reasoning that Congress deliberately withheld section 365(n) protection from rejected
executory trademark licenses. The court implicitly held that the only way a party can
avoid rejection of a trademark license is for the party to persuade the bankruptcy court
early in the case, before licensor receives court approval of its rejection decision, to weigh
the equities and not reject the agreement because its trademarks are integrally linked to
other intellectual property.).
109. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B); S. REP. No. 100-505, at 9 (1988).
110. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(n)(2), (3).
111. See id. § 365(n)(2)(C)(ii).
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addressed whether a licensee who elects to retain its rights should be
required to pay for obligations which are no longer being performed
by the debtor-licensor, although debtors are typically aggressive on
this issue."' Even if a court were to try to act in a way favorable to
Licensee, it would be difficult to determine the price paid for the
technical support and related services as separate from the price paid
for the use of the intellectual property.
Thus, it would be
advantageous for Licensee to take this into consideration when
drafting the relevant agreements and explicitly allocate separate
fees/royalties for the intellectual property and the technical support,
perhaps in separate agreements. That would enable a bankruptcy
court to require Licensee to pay the for the intellectual property it
received, but not require Licensee to pay for the technical support
that Debtor was withholding. Barring some exception or court relief,
though, the automatic stay would prevent Licensee from enforcing
the affirmative terms of its agreement against Debtor. If Licensee
refused to make the required royalty payments, though, Licensee
would be violating the terms of section
365(n) and could be amenable
13
to suit itself for breach of contract.
Licensee has no rights to the intellectual property except for
those rights that existed on the bankruptcy petition date where it
elects to retain intellectual property rights after Debtor's rejection of
the license. Licensee arguably is only entitled to use the underlying
property in the state that it existed on the date of the petition."'
Thus, to the extent that Debtor may modify or improve the licensed
property through post-petition efforts, Licensee arguably has no
rights to such altered property though the agreement contemplated
otherwise."5 Being denied access to later-developed products would
deprive Licensee of its bargain under the licensing agreement, and
often would have severe consequences for its business. Debtor can
file its bankruptcy petition, release a new, later-developed model of
the CureAll (discontinuing the previous one) and effectively
terminate the licensing agreement between Debtor and Licensee.
Further, the exclusivity provision in the original license arguably
could be evaded by Debtor for the newly developed CureAll devices.
Therefore, depending on the nature of the intellectual property and
the advances, Debtor can theoretically profit from the later models of
the CureAll by licensing the underlying rights to a third party (who is
presumably a competitor of Licensee), notwithstanding an exclusivity
112. See Encino Bus. Mgmt., Inc. v. Prize Frize, Inc. (In re Prize Frize, Inc.), 32 F.3d
426, 429 (9th Cir. 1994).
113. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(B).
114. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B); S. REP. No. 100-505, at 9 (1988).
115. See Szombathy v. Controlled Shredders, Inc., 1997 WL 189314, at **2-3 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 14, 1997).
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provision in the rejected license.116
Conclusion
The intersection between bankruptcy and intellectual property
law in the context of licensing and other collaboration agreements is a
conflicted area plagued by the contrasting policies of the two bodies
of law. Given the current economic downturn, the tension will likely
become the focus of much debate and litigation in the near future. In
an attempt to maximize the value of property for creditors,
bankruptcy law often gives too much power to the debtor party,
allowing it to hold its business partners ransom, and has left the
nondebtors without significant protections against such leverage. As
a licensor, the debtor can prevent the nondebtor from retaining any
meaningful rights under an executory intellectual property contract,
even in light of the enactment of section 365(n). Where the debtor is
a licensee, the nondebtor may not be able to keep important
proprietary technology out of the hands of its fiercest competitors.
This forces the nondebtor party to escalate the situation using other
maneuvers and licenses so as to be able to defend its position
indirectly, often through alliances with other creditors at odds with
the debtor. It is clear that the law in this area currently fails to ensure
that parties to intellectual property and other agreements retain the
important rights they bargained for in the face of a bankruptcy
proceeding. For the time being, then, parties must have the foresight
to strategically account for these potential pitfalls in bankruptcy when
structuring and drafting such agreements, at least until Congress
responds with a more effective legislative scheme that balances the
competing bankruptcy and intellectual property policy goals.

116. Cieri & Morgan, supra note 1, at 1677.

